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4
NARRATIVES AND IMAGINED ORDERS OF ISLAMIC SPAIN
“A narrative is a story you tell about where you are and where you’re going. So, a
narrative contains within it the hypothesis of a goal.”
-

Jordan Peterson (2016)

INTRODUCTION
When I first met Farhat, he was washing dishes in the kitchen in the back of the
mosque in the suburbs of Orgiva. We shook hands and said hello, and a few hours
later, after I had been given the tour of the mosque and interviewed some of its leaders
and members, Farhat and I would get to know each other back at Café Baraka in Orgiva
proper. Farhat was the type of person I had been looking forward to interviewing: he
was young, Moroccan, and an illegal immigrant in Spain. He was also affable and
talkative. Some of my prepared questions were: “Do you often think about the Islamic
Empire here in Spain?” (which ended over 500 years ago) and “When you see the
ancient ruins here, do you feel inspired?” He answered these questions politely, but as
he related his personal experience, my questions seemed abstract, and perhaps
ridiculous.
Farhat told me how eight years ago, in hopes to emigrate to Spain, he had
bluffed his way through three levels of security in Ceuta. Then, at the port, he and a few
others found a truck they could hide under and they stayed there, hidden, until the truck
boarded the boat. When the drivers took a coffee break, Farhat and the others came out
to stretch for a while before returning to their cramped spots. Once at the dock in Spain,
he bribed a border official somewhere between 1,000-2,000 Euros to enter Spain, which
one could do at the time, he explained. He stayed for three years, but then he was
caught and deported to Morocco. He repeated the trip, was caught again after only six
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months, then came a third time in a more dangerous and brazen effort.
Security had tightened, so this time Farhat swam out to a boat at dock and tied
himself to it with a kind of a homemade ladder made from wood and cord. He had
packed his belongings in an airtight plastic bag and stayed submerged and skimming in
the water as the boat traveled across the Mediterranean. Because the device was a
kind of ladder, he could pull himself closer to the boat or lower himself farther away as
needed. As of June 2014, Farhat has been in Spain for four years without getting
caught. He met an Australian woman in Orgiva who later returned home to have their
baby. He is trying to earn enough money to join them. He makes leather bags and
bracelets, and does construction and gardening, often in the employment of the Sufi
community in Orgiva.
Farhat escaped abject poverty in Morocco, risked his life, came across enemies,
found friends, fell in love, evaded police, and above all, survived, and still has managed
to send money home. His is “The Hero’s Journey” as described by the mythologist
Joseph Campbell (Campbell, 1949). Many of my prepared questions for young
Moroccan immigrants were regarding the irony for a man to have ancestors and cultural
historical ties to a land to which he “returned” as a foreigner. The irony is there, but, as I
learned, it was not the central point of their experience. Farhat’s preoccupations were
immediate and real. The unique North African and European mix in Andalusia – the
food, the music, the architecture - were all interesting and familiar to him, yes, but
abstractions compared to the tasks at hand.
With each Moroccan I interviewed, the same quizzical grin would come across
their faces when I asked, for example, if the Al hambra made them feel sentimental.
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The men working at the kitschy shops or pizzerias in Granada were people in the
depths of pressing matters, people who missed their families, their homes, their
homelands. They had come for one reason and one reason only: work. There was no
work at home but there is work here. That is all. It was the same reason I had heard
since I was a child when I asked my parents why they had come to America from
Ireland: work. There was no work there so we came here.
The immigrant experience is essentially about work, survival, and remittance.
However, no matter how little one cares about historical narratives, they drive our
perceptions and, therefore, affect our lives. Consider a member of the far-right Falangist
party, who is obsessed with the perceived “Europeaness”, or “whiteness”, of Spanish
history. He may physically confront a Moroccan immigrant who he deems some kind of
threat. Or consider an Islamist, obsessed with the idea of restoring the Caliphate, who
may attempt to “radicalize” the same person. More mundanely, but importantly, consider
a Spaniard working at an NGO, who, due to certain pervasive ideas regarding Spanish
history, might deny the same person a healthcare card to which he is legally entitled
(Rogozen-Soltar, 2012). Imaginings at a deep and unconscious level form the narratives
that we use to conceptualize our world. My goal is to examine the maturation process of
two narratives within the context of the Islamic period in Spain.
As a framework, I rely on the work of the historian Yuval Noah Harari. In his
books, Sapiens (2015) and Homo Deus (2017), Harari reasons that what has driven
human civilization forward is the unique ability to form, cultivate, and share narratives.
This ability to believe, together, enables human-beings to undertake massive projects:
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“While human evolution was crawling at its usual snail’s pace, the human
imagination was building astounding networks of mass cooperation, unlike
any other ever seen on earth… All these cooperation networks – from the
cities of ancient Mesopotamia to the Qin and Roman Empires – were
‘imagined orders’. The social norms that sustained them were based
neither on ingrained instincts nor on personal acquaintances, but rather on
belief in shared myths” (Harari, 2015, 105).
Harari’s concept of “imagined orders” was influenced by Benedict Anderson’s
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1983).
After the demise of “religious communities” and “dynastic realms” from the
Enlightenment, Anderson asserts, nation–states filled the role of framework, but only
because of people’s capacity to believe in this new concept. The belief in this “deep,
horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 1983, 7) underlying and bonding strangers within
imagined boundaries was so powerful that they willingly died for it. Whereas Anderson’s
book focuses on the development of communication networks which have enabled the
formation of nation-states, Harari expands on the idea of collective belief throughout
human history and how it has provided the agency necessary to to do everything from
galvanizing armies to building pyramids.
But not all narratives reach these profound levels. Some narratives, or folklore,
remain local, or whither away. Others reach epic proportions of solidarity and
accomplishment. So, is it possible to deconstruct the elements of narrative to see how
they succeed or go awry? If we parse one, say that of St. James, which played so vital a
role in Spanish history, is it possible to map its elements onto others, to better
understand the process? Also, since Harari emphasizes that these narratives are
fabrications of our minds and, simultaneously, the ultimate force guiding human history,
how can we understand objective reality, or historicity, independent of the narratives

8
which shaped them? Can narratives be believed, even cherished, soley for utility, and
with little regard to veracity? How do these narratives of the past help us conceptualize
the present? And conversely, how do our conceptualizations of the present influence
our understanding of the past?
The Islamic Empire in Spain provides a rich setting to explore these questions.
While interviewing Farhat and other Moroccans in Andalusia, I was interested in the
narratives they used to understand Spain’s Islamic era and how they felt about
“returning,” in a way, to this land. Their ambivalence spoke to their current hardships
and, perhaps, to the dominance of the traditional Spanish narratives. The “reconquista”
narrative, for example, claims that while Muslims once ruled in Spain, they were
eventually defeated and driven out thanks to the heroism demonstrated by Christian
knights.
Counter narratives which emphasize the importance of Islamic heritage and
culture can be traced to the early 19th century when Spain was defining itself as a
nation. That definition came via the Other. Spain was being occupied by Napoleonic
France. One form of resistance was to authenticate parts of itself that were decidedly
not high culture, not cosmopolitan, not French. Thus, across Spain’s diverse cultural
landscapes, provincialities that prior to had been marginalized were now esteemed and
brought into the fold. This included a reckoning of Spain’s Islamic heritage especially
where it was most overtly represented, in Andalusia (Torrecilla, 2009).
The emergence of nation-states required new narratives and in Spain, novels
sympathetic to the Moors of the Islamic era were meant to be part of a unifying process,
but they also represented a divergence from the foundational narratives (Anderson,
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1983, Torrecilla, 2009). If perceptions of Islamic Spain are nuanced or complicated,
what do “the loss of Spain” (the Muslims invasion) and the reconquista really mean?
Nevertheless, the traditional narratives have remained strong and these sympathetic
portraits of Islamic Spain still compete for popularity. Their modern manifestation is in
the form of the convivencia narrative, which is anchored in academic research and
spreading via books and DVD’s.
The stories we tell ourselves about our nation’s history are important because we
use them to conceptualize ourselves, our society, and our place in the world. Each
person I spoke to, or scholar whose work I read, had a narrative in mind, some
ephemeral, some more concrete, but a narrative that was suitable for that person to
understand history in a way which undergirded their understanding of modern day
reality. By extension, these narratives may inform opinions on a range of topics, such as
identity, nation-hood, race, and immigration.
For example, disparities were evident in two conversations I had with two
Spaniards, both Andalusians. My friend Duha is a conversa (the non-perjorative term for
Spanish converts to Islam) and the daughter of a prominent leader in the converso
community. She relayed a story about how, in her grandmother’s time, people would still
wash their hands and arms at wells just as a Muslim would in performing a wudhu (an
Islamic practice of ablution) before entering a mosque. Her point was that Islam and
Islamic culture never actually left Spain, but rather receded to safe places, like the
remote crevices of the Alpujarras, and practices, such as wudhu, were still there, but so
subtle they went mostly unnoticed.
On the other hand, another Spanish woman I spoke to, my host at an AirBnB in
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Granada, held a different perspective. When I asked her about her Islamic heritage she
said, “Yes! Look at me! My nose, my eyes, my nose, my hair! When I go to Morocco or
Turkey I feel normal, like everyone else. It’s part of me, of us, but my friends and I will
say, ‘Thank God we’re not Muslims.’”
In these two examples, one Spaniard is willing to embrace her Islamic heritage
while another does so only on rather selective terms. Yet, however personal our
narratives might seem to us, they are shaped, or at least influenced, by the dominant
narratives of our day. The reconquista narrative, for example, is still prevalent in Spain,
despite its dubious nature, due to its preservation in school books, according to Spanish
friends I spoke with. The effect of this is that “…there is quite a distance from the idea
that there were Muslims in Spain to the idea that Islam is an inextricable part of Spanish
identity” (Flessler, 2008, 1). In accordance with Freudian psychology, Flessler asserts
that in accepting that Muslims were there but not important and simultaneously
suspecting that this isn’t true is a form of repression which can lead to resentment,
discrimination, and even violence against Muslims in contemporary Spain (Flessler,
2008). Yet, counter narratives regarding the technological advancements and religious
tolerance of Islamic Spain have become so well-known that they are often stated in a
common-knowledge and prideful manner.
My interest here is not in arguing the validity of one narrative over another, but
rather, to explore the phenomenon of their transition. As I see it, the distinction between
a narrative and an imagined order is a matter of maturity. Narratives grow and manifest
like organic matter; under certain conditions, they thrive while under others conditions,
they die.
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In Part One, I will discuss the St. James narrative, how it emerged to
become one of the foundational pillars of the Spanish nation, and its elemental
structures. In Part Two, I will discuss the convivencia narrative, the polemic it has
created in contemporary discourse, and compare its structure to that of the St. James
narrative. In Part III, I will discuss the concepts of “Presentism” and “Nostalgia” and how
they elucidate the subjectivities involved in understanding history. The veracity of the
narratives regarding Spain’s Islamic era, which takes up so much space in popular
discourse, is not in question here. Accepting Harari’s assertion that stories from the
human imagination are only as real as they manifest in the real world, my focus will be
on why they manifest, what are the causes of their momentum, or conversely, what
stunts their development. The broader goal is a better familiarity of the path stories
travel from our imaginations as they maneuver into objective reality. By Harari’s
definition, the narrative of St. James is an imagined order because of its epic influence
in the physical world. The question is, then, that in exploring this narrative, can we
measure the potential of another, such as convivencia, to see if it too can become an
imagined order?
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PART ONE: FROM ST. JAMES THE GREATER TO ST. JAMES THE MOORSLAYER
By the time Alphonso II built a church to house the supposed remains of the
Apostle Saint James, what was folklore had become a physical reality. As the shrine,
modest at first, became more famous, and the number of pilgrims increased, the original
church was deemed too small and so Alphonso had a much bigger one built. The
Order of Cluny became well-established along the routes and thereby created an
orderly religious network. Galicia and its environs gained infrastructure and wealth. It
was also significant culturally as it became a place where “art, literature, institutions,
customs, and forms of linguistic expression interacted with religious belief…” (Castro,
1971, 381). Most importantly, Christians and Christian kingdoms coalesced throughout
Spain and broader Europe. Communication and cooperation networks were forming
which would eventually enable them to forge the reconquista. Saint James would be its
patron saint and his shrine the physical and ideological center. In short, it would be
difficult to underestimate the importance of the narrative of Saint James and its
manifestations as one of the dominant and foundational narratives of Spain.
The folkloric story itself, in its most basic form, is that the apostle traveled to
Spain to spread the gospel. When he returned to Jerusalem some time later, he was
beheaded by King Herod. His followers then took his remains back to Spain, to the
Roman port of Iria Flavia in Galicia, traveled inland, and buried his remains. The story
survived, but was given no great importance until, in the early ninth century, it is
purported that a hermit experienced a vision near the site of the saint’s grave: “…a
bright star shining over a huge oak tree which stood alone on a hill… accompanied by
the sound of celestial music” (Crow, 2005, 83). The clergy was informed and the
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happening became such that Alphonso III was compelled to build a church where the
remains could be kept. But one might ask, why the northwest of Spain in the ninth
century? Why did this particular narrative, and not another, unfurl across this society?
Are there even answers to these questions or was it just a matter of fate?
According to the Spanish historian Americo Castro, the fact that such a remote
place, which prior to this had held no historical significance, would become a pilgrimage
site that rivaled Rome and Jerusalem, could not have been arbitrary. He reasoned that
the expansion from folklore to epic was born of desperation:
“At the beginning of the ninth century, some hundred years after the
Saracen invasion, the Christians in the northwest of Spain must have felt
themselves very weak materially and spiritually. They were already
seriously isolated from the rest of Christendom in the Visigothic period.
Now this isolation must have been almost complete” (Castro, 1971, 383).
Though the basic story of St James had existed for centuries, its lack of
significance was due to, and in proportion to, its lack of utility. Castro relates that
prior to the Islamic conquest, “St. Julian, archbishop of Toledo, was familiar with this
tradition and did not accept it; according to him, St. James preached in Palestine and
not in Spain” (Castro, 1971, 406). Certainly, there was no evidence, then or now, that
St. James had ever preached in Spain, much less had his remains brought there. So,
the narrative’s validity could not reasonably explain its eventual dominance; rather, it
was its utility.
The first wave of the Islamic conquest came in 711:
“In less than ten years, Islam controlled most Spanish territory. HispanoRomans and Visigoths became dhimmis non-Muslims required to pay a
tax …or converted to the hegemonic religion, or fled for their lives. Many
escaped to the mountainous regions of Asturias and Galicia in the
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northwest, which remained… largely free from Muslim control”
(Fernandez-Morera, 2016, 21).
Treaties were arranged in some cities for the sake of peace, but as related in a
primary Latin source, Chronicle of 754, “…when the citizens subsequently rejected
what they had accepted out of fear and terror, they tried to flee to the mountains where
they risked hunger and various forms of death” (cited by Constable, 1997, 35).
Castro writes that it was there that “…the anxiety of the eight and ninth centuries
fortified the faith in Santiago” (Castro, 1971, 382). The narrative grew, and spread,
because people were compelled to rally around an idea that would provide comfort.
They probably had no inkling that it would one day provide power. It was depression,
devastation, and trauma that sparked the growth from narrative to imagined order. Not
every society would have to evoke a heroic form, which St. James came to be, because
not every society would need to. The psychologist Jordan Peterson in discussing the
birth of mythological heroes explains,
“…the hero is always born at the time of maximal crisis… if your culture is
dealing well with the forces unknown, so that everything is static, but
productive, so that problems themselves don’t arise, there’s no reason for
the hero... there’s no reason to confront the unknown” (Peterson, 2016).
Since Christians and Jews in “Al-Andalus” were in the process of assimilating,
or adapting to elements of Islamic culture, there was no need to develop a hero
narrative. But in the northwest of Spain there was isolation and fear, a period of crisis,
and “it’s only when crisis beckons that the birth of the hero is necessary” (Peterson,
2016).
Castro suggests that this phenomenon of fortifying strength via narrative, shrine,
and pilgrimage is actually a group survival mechanism: “…faith in the image and in the
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virtues of the Apostle was theme of prime importance for the continued existence of a
people” (Castro, 1971, 396). The shrine gave them a place to go, congregate, and
share in a communal experience. Of course, the idea of communal strength via shrine
and pilgrimage was not new. By the ninth century, the Islamic Empire had spread from
India to the Atlantic shores of Iberia and North Africa. Their culture was superior
politically and culturally. The awestruck Christians must have wondered, from what root
did their power grow? With the pilgrimage to Compostela, the small town where St.
James remains were at peace, the Christians were simply imitating the Muslim’s
pilgrimage to Mecca in hopes to garner a similar power (Monroe, 1976, Crow, 2005).
“The Moors, unknowingly, had taught the Spanish Christians how to win
the struggle against them. Not only had they shown how essential was
union itself, but they had even shown how this union might be achieved:
through the banner of a dynamic religion” (Crow, 2005, 82).
The comparison of Compostela to Mecca is neither a western interpretation nor a
new one. After al-Mansur sacked Compostela in 997, the poet Ibn Darraj al-Qastalli
wrote in his honor: “From now on devote yourself to pilgrimage to Muslims, now that you
have destroyed the Christians shrine of pilgrimage” (Darraj al-Qastalli, cited by
Monroe, 1976, 75). This concept of movement in a religious conformity, whether
circumambulating the Kabaa or trekking to a pilgrimage site, is considered universal.
Durkheim argues: “…this conformity of conduct only translates to conformity of
thought. Every mind being drawn into the same eddy, the individual type nearly
confounds itself with that of the race” (Durkheim, 1915, 6).
For a story to eventually reach the level of an imagined order, the first element
required is the time of crisis. The present condition is unsustainable therefore change
must occur. Since James was already a patron saint of Spain, it would follow that his
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importance would increase and his essence could be utilized in this way. However, the
development of this particular heroic figure is curious. After all, how is it that Saint
James the Greater, who played such a small role in the New Testament, and exhibited
no heroic dimensions, transformed, by the 11th century, into “St. James the
Moorslayer”? Another important element in the maturation process is that the narrative
evolve as appropriate to the need. If James had stayed as he was in the 6th century in
Spain, “…a pilgrim with the characteristic pilgrim’s staff, cloak and cape” (Miller and
Fossey, 2004, 65), he would have hardly inspired the spirit necessary for battle. St.
James needed to be a warrior. But how does a transformation like that occur?
First, it was crucial that St. James be the brother of Jesus. Matthew 13:15 states,
“Isn’t this the carpenter’s son? Isn’t his mother’s name Mary, and aren’t his brothers
James, Joseph, Simon and Judas?” Though it is widely understood that this James is
not the same James mentioned elsewhere in the New Testament, in medieval Spain,
this misinterpretation of brotherhood became more or less accepted, and eventually
emphasized. If James is the brother of Jesus, he is virtually divine. Also, as brothers,
James and Jesus became metaphysically and psychologically linked to the twin horse
gods of Roman mythology, Castor and Pollux. As Castro describes:
“For centuries this fraternal relationship, James and Jesus as brothers
forgotten by orthodoxy, formed the core of that belief… such a belief bore
a resemblance to certain pre-Christian cults of twin divinities like Castor
and Pollux – the Dioscuri or sons of Jupiter – one of whom ascended to
heaven while the other remained on earth… as a protector of man”
(Castro, 1971, 382).
In Proto-Indo-European myths, these twins were known to do everything from
saving sailors at sea in ancient Greece to fetching water for the thirsty in India, but what

17
they were especially known for was military intervention, striking down on the enemy
from the sky on horseback (Walker, 2015). And that is precisely what St. James is said
to have done in the Battle of Clavijo. The historicity of the battle, even including the year
it was fought, is unclear, but the mythic stories about it are not. St. James is supposed
to have come down from the sky on a white horse to assist King Ramiro’s forces as they
fought the superior Muslim army. Ramiro won the battle ultimately and was so assured
of St. James’ presence that:
“…in gratitude for St. James's assistance in the defeat of the Moors the
king was made to decree that every part of Spain under Christian rule
should render annually a certain quantity of corn and wine to the cathedral
community of Compostela” (Fletcher, 1984, 293).
From there, the momentum was such that St. James was said to have
miraculously appeared in many battles. By the 12th century, the military order of
Santiago was established. St. James’ interventions have been rendered, quite
dramatically, in paintings, carvings, engravings, sculptures, coinage, and flags. The
imagery was thanks in no small part to a book written in the 13th century under the
auspices of Alfonso X. The Cronica general:
“…offers the physical description of Santiago Matamoros on which later
iconographic representations will be based… dressed as a warrior on a
white steed; in one hand he carries a sword, in the other a white banner,
emblazoned with the red cross of Santiago. The most evocative aspect of
the imagery is the presence of the fallen, often beheaded, infidels” (Miller
and Fossey, 2004, 65).
In popular culture, there is an accompanying slogan: “¡Santiago, y Cierra
España!” (“St. James and close Spain!”). His reach extended into the New World where
the idea of “the killer of moors” was apparently transformed to the killer of indigenous
peoples. I remember seeing an iconic statue of the saint in a small church in Cusco,
Peru.
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Because there was no question of the power or purpose of Castor and Pollux, by
linking them to St. James, he had boundless potential. Castro writes of this connection
as a matter already well-established, but laments that it is often ignored:
“It is surprising that the scholars not acquainted with such basic principles
of cultural continuity should be scandalized and upset to find out that a
long time ago several cultural historians related the warlike figure of
Santiago and his white horse to the ancient tradition of the Dioscuri. This
relationship is… a normal phenomenon within the broad picture of
connections between Christianity and earlier religions” (Castro, 1971,
389).
But what are the processes by which archetypal figures ebb and flow over time?
Were stories of the twin horse gods passed on from generation to generation in the
countryside from Roman days? Or did they exist in the Jungian collective unconscious
only waiting to be aroused by need? Had the horse gods, who were apparently
already skilled in traversing time and space, done so again? The historian Henry John
Walker (2015) uses the metaphor of a kind of air-born contagion to explain the
phenomenon: “Stories behave more as waves than as particles, and they spread like
the bubonic plague rather than like an invading horde of heroes, or a tragic chorus of
migrants” (Walker, 2015, 38). But Castro suggested that their forms were from a people
not far removed from their pagan roots, which would be in accord with Jungian
psychology. To Jung, the hero is an archetype who inhabits the unconscious mind and
whose purpose is to “create myths, religions, and philosophies that influence and
characterize whole nations and epochs of history” (Jung, 1968, 68).
However, while the roots of the narrative may have come from the unconscious
mind, as Castro and Jung would have it, one shouldn’t underestimate the nurturing of
the narrative by those who benefitted from it. Fletcher marks each mention of St. James
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in historical texts over a span of centuries. Each mention was made, of course, by those
in power to do so suggesting that religious figures and their royal benefactors were
cultivating the narrative (Fletcher, 1984). Therefore, there is the conscious and
deliberate action of political maneuvering to consider. Since the clergy and nobility
were the politicians of their day, it is worth contemplating whether they were simply
recording prevalent stories or embellishing them for political ends.
At any rate, there they were, Castor and Pollux, in medieval Spain, cloaked as
Jesus and James, and ready to serve the same needs they always had, as military
interventionists. But why exactly did they have to be disguised? Why couldn’t Castor
and Pollux have simply emerged in their archaic Roman form?
It was crucial that the narrative be Christian because that is how that particular
society conceptualized the world. A narrative not within the Christian framework would
have been too radical and disorienting and therefore useless. A narrative too much
within the framework, i.e. too traditional, too Christian, would have been useless too.
What was required was a heroic figure who was new and dynamic, yet also entrenched
in the traditional and the stable. As Maurice Halbwachs, in describing the rise of
Christianity within the Judaic framework, writes:
“The society wished to adopt these larger and deeper beliefs without
entirely rupturing the framework of notions in which it has matured up until
this point. That is why at the same time that society projects into its past
conceptions that were recently elaborated, it is also intent on incorporating
into the new religion elements of old cults that are assimilable into a new
framework” (Halbwachs, 1992, 86).
If the past’s purpose is to serve the present and the collective imagination
already held the power to do so, it needed only to be filtered into a Christian framework.
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This willful but unconscious distortion, Halbwachs explains, happens at both the societal
level and the personal: “Is it not the case that adults deform their memories of childhood
precisely because they force them to enter into the framework of the present?”
(Halbwachs,1992, 47).
Support is an important element in the maturation process of the St. James
narrative and while it came most notably from the Order of Cluny as they recorded the
supposed acts of the saint in texts (Fletcher, 1984), it also came via broader narratives
attempting to legitimate Christian hegemony. The religious and cultural connection of
Christian Spain to the Visigoths, who ruled in Spain after the Roman collapse and prior
to the Islamic conquest, became emphasized. By presupposing that the land is
intrinsically Christian, Muslims, despite the success of their culture and length of their
rule, could only be viewed as interlopers. The poet Federico Garcia Lorca mockingly
called this idea “Visigothism” and he was not alone in criticizing the validity of
this assertion. Yet, the narrative persists.
In 722, the Asturian king, Pelayo, and his army retreated to the mountains to
avoid the Muslim encroachment. According to the Chronicle of Alphonso III, written in
the 9th century, Pelayo’s army regrouped, then attacked, and, against terrible odds,
outlasted the Muslim forces. The chronicle reports that 187,000 Muslims warriors were
slain. However, this number is exaggerated as it is greater than the entire Muslim
population in the peninsula at the time (Lowney, 2008). The significance of the battle to
the overall picture is dubious too. The Muslims by this time controlled almost all of Iberia
and Muslim chroniclers seem to consider this battle as nothing more than a minor
squabble with mountainous rebels (Lowney, 2008). However, in subsequent
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descriptions of the battle, Pelayo was not only established as a figurehead of resistance
but an heir to the Visigothic thrones. The Chronicle of Alphonoso III states that Pelayo
was “hand-picked by God to begin the restoration of Gothic Spain” (cited by Flessler,
2008, 63). This “restoration” of what was lost would have triggered a powerful nostalgia
however remote it was from the truth.
The Visigoths were Germanic tribes that practiced a significantly different variety
of Christianity for most of their time in the peninsula. Besides, the people in the
mountainous region of Pelayo’s time were as isolated from the Visigoths as they were
from from the Muslims (Fletcher 1984). This imagined linkage then to the Visigoths,
could be considered as “more reflections of late ninth-century intent than descriptions of
eight-century events” (Collins, cited by Flessler, 2008, 63). However, Hartog, in
examining the way in which different cultures perceive time, states: “Christianity’s
specific contribution was the decisive event of the Incarnation- the birth, death, and
resurrection of the Son of God made man- which broke time in two” (Hartog, 2002, 60).
Given that time was perceived in this way, before the birth of Christ and after, any break
in continuity would have been inconceivable.
In the narrative of St. James, as well as in its supporting narratives, some things
are emphasized while others are diminished or omitted. The Battle of Tours, for
example, in which Muslim advances were halted by the Franks, is meant to be a final
stop to Muslim advancement. The “Cordoban martyrs” (Christians within the empire who
openly disparaged the prophet Mohammad knowing that would lead to their execution)
are perceived as emblems of heroic resistance. Christians living in peace in Islamic
Spain, or those who converted to Islam, are not mentioned. All together, they form the
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meta-narrative of the reconquista. This monolithic idea in which Christians and
Muslims were fighting each other for nearly 800 years, however, does not hold up to
scrutiny. In fact, from 711 to the fall of Granada in 1492, there were long stretches of
peace in which members of the three great religions lived side by side. To refer to this
complicated and prolonged period of time as a series of wars in which Christians were
gradually retaking their homeland would be a gross simplification. In fact, even in war
time, loyalties were not necessarily based on faith:
“…there were wars among the Christians themselves; there were wars
among the Moorish kingdoms and factions, and there were even wars in
which Christians and Moors fought as allies against other Christians and
Moors” (Crow, 1963, 79).
However, it is precisely the Manichean quality of “Christians versus Moors” that
lends strength to the narrative enabling it to evolve into an imagined order. People don’t
rally around nuance and complications. The battle of Christians and Moors is simple
and lively, like any battle of good guys and bad guys.
The St. James story was born of crisis, and evolved into a story which could aid
and fortify its victims. The narrative was fixed in the pre-existing framework of
Christianity, yet extended back to powerful ancient folklore for power, and to the
Visigoths for legitimacy. It was nurtured by those who controlled the written word
and communication networks, molding the narrative by omissions, emphasis, and
imaginings. Finally, its reductionist Manichean qualities suited popular consumption:
Christian against Moor, we against them. In Part Two, I will deconstruct the
contemporary narrative of convivencia to see if the same, or similar, elements are at
work.
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PART TWO: CONVIVENCIA
When I asked my friend Javier, who is from Valencia, about Santiago
Matamoros, he chuckled. It was a name he hadn’t heard for a while. Santiago de
Compostela yes, matamoros no. In fact, Javier had trekked part of the pilgrimage a few
years ago, as many have for well over a thousand years, and said it was a bit of
adventure and that he had met some great people. In a 2010 film entitled “The Way”,
five characters walk towards the small city in the northwest of Spain, each seeking a
kind of catharsis, but the religiosity of the pilgrimage is, at most, suggested, not overt.
Underscoring the correlation between narrative and need, it seems that the old saint,
having served his purpose as divine inspiration and military interventionist, had left his
horse and banner and returned to his cloak and walking stick.
I asked Javier about the term convivencia and how the Islamic era was taught in
school. He understood convivencia literally, as in “living together”, but was not so
familiar with Castro’s interpretation of the Islamic era. Regarding his school books, he
said, “…it was very politically correct. They left a great cultural heritage, but we are not
part of them… They are not actually part of us. My memories from the books are that
they were around and then they left.” When I reminded him just how long Muslims
lived in Spain and how they must have mixed with the population, Javier’s head tilted
back and he grew ponderous. As a PhD candidate in Human Rights Education, he
found the topic interesting, but had not previously given it much thought. I would have
had the same reaction if asked about parts of American history. It occurred to me that
unless we look closer, our perceptions default to whatever the dominant narratives are,
even if we consider them with some skepticism. Examination will complicate storylines
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as well as lead to more questions, but who has the time?
Mohammed was a busy man. He worked long hours in a pizzeria and was just
coming from prayers at a mosque in La Cortujo, a neighborhood far from the city
center of Granada. Still, he took the time to talk to me about his life there and the history
of Andalusia. He said the architecture and the culture was special and that just seeing
the Alhambra in the distance made him feel comfortable, “…but that’s not why I came
here. I came for work and it so happens there are strong ties to my culture.” He
explained that he could have just as easily wound up in Germany and that winding up in
Granada was just a matter of circumstance. There was a tone of ambivalence in
regards to Spain’s history and how much it mattered in every day life.
Mohammad directed me back to the neighborhood from which I had come, the
Albaicin, and to the mosque there. This wasn’t the first time I was directed by a
Moroccan immigrant in Granada to the more European, more cosmopolitan venue
despite my stated desire to talk to working-class Moroccan immigrants. In fact, when
making arrangements via AirBnB, my host assured me the Albaicin was a Moroccan
neighborhood. When I arrived, I could see we misunderstood each other. The Albaicin
was Moroccan, perhaps, in architecture and history, but now it is a posh area replete
with home security systems and BMW’s winding up and down its steep and narrow
cobblestone streets.
The Albaicin mosque was beautiful and its story fascinating, but when I
mentioned to my hosts, Maria and Wolfgang, that I wanted to see other mosques, Maria
was incredulous. “But this is still a Catholic country!” she said, implying that there simply
were no other mosques in Granada. By asking around, I found that there were no fewer
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than five, but one could forgive her the mistake. The one in La Cortujo, where I met
Mohammad, was on the outskirts of town, in the basement of a supermarket, and its
gate opened only to a backyard. It was not easy to find even for someone provided with
directions as I was.
And then, when I did find it, I was directed back to the Albaicin. I put my
annoyance aside and considered the significance. For one, the Albaicin mosque would
have English speakers, which was good as my Spanish was not terrific. For another, the
Albaicin mosque was a virtual flagship of Islam in Spain, nestled in an affluent and
scenic neighborhood with a spectacular view of the Al hambra while the mosque in La
Cortujo was simple and functional, for working-class men from West and North Africa.
Mohammed just didn’t see how the latter would appeal to me.
There was a class distinction here and I asked about it. Mohammed said he’d be
welcome in the Albaicin mosque, sure, it was a mosque after all and he was a Muslim.
He shrugged. “They’re knowledgeable of the history of Andalusia”, he said, “and will be
better able to answer your questions.” I did go and I met an Englishman, Ali Keeler, who
is a musician and member of the Al Firdaus Ensemble. After a chat with Ali and his wife,
he directed me to Orgiva, a town in the Alpurrajas region, where I met a number of
people including Farhat. From there, I went on to Cordoba where I would meet Duha
Escudero, the daughter of the founder of La Junta Islamica, Mansur Escudero. Most of
the people I met were conversos, or New Muslims, and members of the Sufi
Naqshbandi order. All were pleasant and happy to answer my questions.
The fact that I was gravitating towards this community made sense. A secular
Sufi community was a natural starting point for an American and a non-Muslim. If I were
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to learn more about Islam in Spain, it would be through these doors. It was good to
talk to people who embodied a way of living that was in accord with a narrative that was
not only important to them but different from Spain’s traditional narratives. This counternarrative is often expressed by a term coined by Americo Castro in the 1940’s, which
has continued to evolve with the times- convivencia.
Convivencia was, originally, a linguistic term referring to the situation necessary
for a blending of languages, and coined by the Spanish philologist, Ramón Menéndez
Pidal (Szpiech, 2014). Pidal used it to describe how regional phonetics eventually
evolved into one language. Castro was a student of Pidal’s and must have been familiar
with the term before going on to use it in his work España en su historia (1948).
Castro used the term more in a sociological sense, but it seems to have had the
same meaning in spirit: different entities, or parts, existing together and inhabiting the
same space, before eventually merging. It was through this co-habitation that Muslims,
Christians, and Jews would mix (linguistically, culturally, genetically, and so on) and
then forge, Castro submitted, the unique Spanish identity. Importantly, with this concept
of convivencia, Castro broke from the more common and long-standing monolithic
narrative, which was, essentially, that Christians were the true Spaniards and the
Muslims were nothing more than invaders, or interlopers.
Castro’s assertion spawned what Szpiech calls “The Convivencia Wars”: the
long-standing, multi-generational polemic regarding the Islamic era’s role in Spanish
history and identity. However, it is often utilized to discuss broader issues by proxy:
shifting demographics, immigration, religion, secularism, terrorism and so on. Szpiech
writes:
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“…convivencia has generated for over half a century and continues to
generate a vast array of widely divergent and fractious interpretations.
Convivencia, ironically, has become a source of modern scholarly conflict
and an inspiration for ongoing polemic” (Szpiech, 2014, 136).
Castro’s most well-known contemporary detractor was the Spanish historian
Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz, who stated that Islamic Spain was a “…national disaster
from which Spain was never able to recover,” blaming the era for stunting Spain’s
development and not being able to flourish as, say, France and Germany had
(Sanchez-Albornoz, cited by Monroe, 1976, 70). This view is still supported by a number
of historians who consider convivencia’s revitalization emblematic of current political
trends and though they dismiss it intellectually, they take it seriously as a threat (Fanjul,
2009, Fernandez-Morera, 2016).
If it was Castro’s goal for the concept to manifest beyond scholarly discourse
and into popular culture, he succeeded. In addition to a multitude of academic works,
there are popular books, novels, documentaries, art exhibits, and events. However, the
contemporary popular usage of the term may have puzzled Castro as it evolved from a
matter of Spanish ancestry and cultural identity to short-hand for the concept of multiculturalism. A Google search of the term and a click on “images” finds pictures of
children of various complexions playing together, or a bumper sticker with the word “coexist” spelled out with religious symbols. The idea is perhaps best expressed in the
introduction to the 2011 PBS film, “Cities of Light”:
“Over a thousand years ago, the sun-washed land of southern Spain was
home to Jews, Christians, and Muslims living together and flourishing.
Their cultures and beliefs intertwined and the knowledge of the ancients
was gathered and reborn. Here were the very seeds of the Renaissance”
(2007).
This is a vision not only of an idyllic society, but also pivotal to European history,
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and an inspiration to present day ills (Menocal, 2002).
Is it possible then, to use the aforementioned elemental structures of the
narrative of St. James and see if they map onto the narrative of convivencia? If they are
all present, might that mean that this narrative could become dominant in its own right?
Each narrative had humble origins: the story of St. James’ started as provincial folklore;
convivencia was a concept conjured by a historian living in exile. The genesis of the St.
James narrative was crisis. For those who fled to the haven of northwest Spain in the 8 th
century, the reasons were clear enough, but what crisis allowed convivencia to occupy
a prominent place among Spanish national narratives?
Castro might have thought the crisis was Franco’s brutal dictatorship while he
himself lived and worked in the United States. But the end of the Franco era was
another hardship for Spain, as it opened up and attempted to gain its footing in the
European community. The Junta Islamica, for example, was formed in 1978, the same
year the Spanish Constitution was ratified and 3 years after Franco’s death. It has been
suggested, with its socialist roots and embrace of Islam, that it was an affront to the old
regime (Abend, 2008). Another crisis was in 1992, the quincentennial of the fall of
Granada. Counter to traditional nationalist narratives, this was seen by many as a tragic
event and linked to the current tragedy of the systematic murder of Muslims in Bosnia
(Doubleday, 2008, Menocal, 2002). Or was the crisis the attacks in the United States on
September 11th, 2001 and in Madrid on March 11th 2004?
Crisis is a period of disorientation and eventual reorientation. Simon Doubleday
describes the period after the towers fell as a time “…when conventional narrative
failed… a space had been violently opened, and for a few hours, no familiar story could
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be told” (Doubleday, 2008, 9). The psychologist Jordan Peterson uses a metaphor of a
broken down car to describe the process: the car, now that is not running, is no longer a
car, but an assemblage of car parts. As such, it “…reveals itself suddenly… as a noncompliance with your wishes as the complex structured entity that it actually is”
(Peterson, 2017).
The specialized knowledge required to fix your car is that of a mechanic, but
who, exactly, has the specialized knowledge to help us reorient ourselves after a
trauma, or series of traumas? Of course, there is no shortage of the politically-motivated
who wish to explain what has happened (and what we should do about it) as they vie to
“control the narrative.” As the name of his essay, “Criminal Non-Intervention” (2008),
suggests, Doubleday discusses whether scholars should take a more pro-active role in
this process because for too long, they have stood on the sidelines, intellectually
detached.
As an example of a more willful participation in current events, Maria Rosa
Menocal’s book The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians
Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain (2002) weaves the storylines from
Islamic Spain to those of the present day by cautioning against the perennial danger:
religious extremism. She describes a period of enlightenment and tolerance in Spain
under Islamic rule, but by the late 12th century,
“…more puritanical visions of these cultures converged in Iberia. The
determinedly crusading forces of Latin Christendom and the equally
fanatic Berber Almohads became influential parts of the landscape and
inevitably met, head-on… at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212” (Menocal,
2002, 267).
The Almohads, and before them the Almoravids, had invaded the peninsula
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from North Africa and brought with them more rigid practices of Islam than had been
practiced by the Umayyads. As the Umayyad dynasty had already been ruptured into
competing kingdoms, or ta’ifas, the hope with the invading empires was reunification,
but they only managed to weaken Islamic strongholds and Menocal suggests that that
was due to their overbearing religiosity, which was antithetical to “the Andalusian ethic”
(Menocal, 2002, 44). The Almohad loss to a Christian army at Las Navas de Tolosa is
widely considered a turning point in Spanish history as the hegemony in the peninsula
shifted from Islamic to Christian. It also represents a benchmark in religious ideological
warfare. The last Muslim kingdom, Granada, would fall in 1492 and the subsequent
extermination, forced conversion, and expulsion of Jews and Muslims in Spain is still
considered the nadir of inter-religious loathing.
In the postscript, which was written shortly after 9/11, Menocal describes her
book as a “… tribute to the culture of tolerance brought to Europe by the Umayyads. But
the book is also necessarily an account of the forces of intolerance that were always
present and ultimately triumphed” (Menocal, 2002, 282). Though she does not use the
word, The Ornament of the World is a eulogy for convivencia, which is the idea, or ideal,
of a peaceful, multi-cultural society in Islamic Spain. As this society was interrupted by
the fundamentalist Berber tribes from North Africa, and ultimately destroyed by Christian
forces, the analogy to modern day tragedies was compelling.
In a review of her book in The Nation (2002), Christopher Hitchens seems as
enthusiastic about Menocal’s portrayal of Averroes and Maimonides as he was of her
stance against religious extremism. As an ardent and outspoken atheist, Hitchens
expanded on the theme:
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“…in the National Cathedral after September 11 he Billy Graham was
allowed in the presence of our country’s elite to assert that all the murder
victims were in paradise and happy to be there–a wild outburst of evil and
stupidity that implicitly copies the fantasies of bin Laden” (Hitchens, 2002).
Hitchens goes on to darkly describe the inappropriateness of the evangelist’s
presence in the White House through several administrations. It seemed to matter little
to Hitchens, and to Menocal, which religion the fundamentalists were feverish about.
They were all dangerous.
In this way, the ideal of convivencia has been utilized as a technique to “build
bridges” across religious communities that are too often, for various socio-political
reasons, belligerent towards each other. Menocal’s book, while emblematic, is only part
of a much broader purview, which the anthropologist Jessica Winegar describes
after the 9/11 attacks:
“…many local and national arts institutions, universities, and grassroots
organizations launched Middle East or Islam-related arts events for the
first time… an exhibition of art made by young Iranians at the Meridian
International Center in Washington; a display of calligraphic art at the
University of Michigan Museum of Art; an exhibition of Sufi artists at a
gallery in the Hamptons; a show featuring contemporary Palestinian art at
Houston’s Station Museum…” (Winegar, 2006, 653)
This is just part of a long list of events all aimed at humanizing “the Other” and
creating a sense of “mutual understanding.”
Of course, the appeal to our better angels was not the only narrative to emerge
from recent crises. More forceful ones, even from other scholars, competed. Positioning
himself in the heart of the polemic, Doubleday writes:
“…while 9/11 may have transformed public consciousness about the
United States, atrocities against civilian populations had repeatedly been
committed over the previous generation by Western democracies

32
themselves, encouraging increasingly radical forms of Islamic militancy”
(Doubleday, 2008, 9).
He goes on to say that among the “proximate causes” for the problems in the
Middle East are the United States’ support for Israel as well as support for Islamic
militancy against the Soviet Union in the 1980’s (Doubleday, 2008).
Moreover, linking the history of Islamic Spain to current events was not
necessarily in support of a multi-cultural future. "Let the whole world know that we shall
never accept that the tragedy of Andalusia would be repeated in Palestine", Osama bin
Laden said in an interview broadcast on Al Jazeera and cited in the Washington Post
(2001). Statements such as “the tragedy of Al-Andalus” and “Spain is a stolen Muslim
land” have been echoed by Al-Qaeda’s intellectual leader, Al-Zawahiri, as well as in the
propaganda of ISIS, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant
Group, which carried out the Madrid bombings. While 11/M was almost certainly
motivated by Spain’s participation in the war in Iraq, there are reports of broader,
historically-based grievances, including the reclamation of lost Muslim land (Lee, 2004,
Svirsky, 2013).
And then there are the seasoned controllers of narrative: politicians, for whom
crisis always equals opportunity to push agendas. In regards to the 9/11 and 11/M
attacks, Spain’s prime minister at the time, Jose Maria Aznar, a member of Spain’s
conservative Partido Popular, articulated that in order to understand Spain’s
relationship to Islamic terrorism “…you must go back 1,300 years, to the early eighth
century, when a Spain recently invaded by the Moors refused to become just another
piece in the Islamic world and began a long battle to recover its identity” (Aznar, cited
by Tremlett, 2008).

33

This brief survey of a few narratives is meant to demonstrate that convivencia is
one among many competing for attention in the information age. However lofty its
aspirations, Castro’s idea that the Islamic era was critical to Spanish identity remains
controversial and the more recent practice of linking Castro’s ideas to multiculturalism,
along with the notion of “bridge-building, remains hotly contested.
However, convivencia is not limited to a political narrative. In fact, by structuring
her book in a series of miniature portraits from the era, Menocal’s The Ornament of the
World transforms the Islamic era from a politicized abstraction to a human reality. She
describes Samuel ibn Nagrila, for example, an Arabized Jew who rose to the station of
vizier and, inspired by Arabic poetry, lent its forms and themes to Hebrew, which had
previously been only theological. The scholar, Ibn Rushd, or Averroes, translated,
and therefore preserved, works of ancient Greece. Menocal reasons that underlying the
success of the era’s poets, philosophers, and scientists was a strong society, the
accomplishments of which are undeniable: a thriving economy, irrigation techniques,
paved roads, aqueducts, well-lit streets, fine architecture, and scientific advancements.
The Cordoban library, for example, boasted over 400,000 volumes, by far the largest in
the world (Menocal, 2002).
So, there is an objectively solid foundation from which more subjective
imaginings emerge. Affixed to the Islamic era’s accomplishments is the idea that
Muslims, Christians, and Jews enjoyed those accomplishments together in a thriving
and peaceful society. Taking the idea further, we can see this society as a beacon of
hope for present-day religious strife. Therefore, a mutually beneficial binary relationship
presents itself: the imagined reality of the past inspires and instructs the present. The
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present, in turn, projects its values onto the past; each serving the other. However
appealing, these projections onto the past have precipitated much criticism.
In Creative Reckonings (2006), Jessica Winegar describes western critics,
curators, and owners of downtown Cairo galleries as oblivious agents in the continuum
of Orientalism as they exert power and socio-economic control over the visual arts world
in Egypt. The ideas they promote–autonomy, individualism, rebellion –are not
universally desirable traits, rather, they are peculiar to the western aesthetic. The typical
attitude toward the Middle East, Winegar recounts, is that it is still “evolving”, and trying
to “catch up”, or “break free.” All of which implies, consciously or unconsciously, that
western society is superior. That is, the Middle East is evolving towards what?
In her essay, “The Humanity Game: Art, Islam and the War on Terror” (2008),
Winegar describes how art exhibits from the Middle East were promoting a particular
perspective after the attacks. American liberal elites were utilizing art to “humanize”
people of the Middle East lest they not be perceived as otherwise. Do we need
examples of compassionate Muslim leadership and Muslim societies valuing tolerance?
If so, then the thought process is flawed because it implies that Muslims could be
perceived as non-human in the first place. Anyone who actually thinks that probably
wouldn’t go to the event. Those who do attend may be annoyed at the didacticism.
There may be similar well-intentioned motivations at play in the convivencia
narrative as modern values are superimposed over those of a medieval society. At
various points in The Ornament of the World, Menocal refers to: “Andalusian
progressiveness”, “the multiethnic and religiously pluralistic state”, “cultural openness
and ethnic egalitarianism”, and the “vital secular culture” (Menocal, 2002, 44, 59, 73,

35

74). If we look to a medieval society for inspiration because it embodied multiculturalism and secularism, we should also keep in mind that these are modern values,
and western ones. Therefore, there is a possibility of romantic projection. In A Vanished
World, Lowney writes that Islamic Spain “… allows us some glimpse of what a common
society might look like” (Lowney, 2008, 14). This, though the author is from New York
City.
The Arabist Serafin Fanjul writes that convivencia (also often referred to simply
as “al-Andalus”, or the idea of “Las Tres Culturas”) is:
“…twenty-first century version of Hispanic Islam from a sweetened and
imaginary tenth-century model…and that… The embellished image of an
idyllic al-Andalus… where practitioners of the ‘three cultures’ and three
religions live in constant harmony is untenable and impossible to
substantiate” (Fanjul, 2009, 231).
Instead, he asserts that, ’al-Andalus’, as far as morality was concerned, was no
better or worse than contemporary Muslim and European societies (Fanjul, 2009).
In The Myth of the Andalusian Paradise (2016), the historian Dario
Fernandez-Morera scrutinizes the claims of the convivencia narrative. The celebrated
blending of the cultures, for example, is merely typical of what always happens in
periods of colonization, according to Fernandez-Morera. He writes that this cultural
exchange has happened,
“…in places where different cultures have been antagonistic-from Spanish
and Portuguese Latin America to British India to French Algeria to the
American west to even the slaveholding of the America South… of course
there was convivencia, in this rather banal sense” (Fernandez-Morera,
2016, 3).
This “banal sense” is that segregated peoples still, physically, share much of the
same space.
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In attempting to understand the quotidian existence of Christians and Jews
under Islamic law, it is necessary to consider the system of dhimmitude. Christians and
Jews were dhimmis, which meant they were protected so long as they paid a tax, or
jizya. Menocal implies that dhimmitude as it was practiced in the Umayyad dynasty was
different from the rest of the Islamic world and describes it as a “very generous
interpretation” and that “…the Andalusian Muslims understood the dhimma in ways that
seem extravagant” (Menocal, 2000, 8). Fernandez-Morera, on the other hand, asserts
that Christian dhimmis were treated as a
“…subaltern group, a fourth- or fifth- class marginalized people in a
hierarchal society, and that they were victims of an extortion system, the
dhimma, that gave them the choice gangsters give to their victims: pay to
be protected, or else” (Fernandez-Morera, 2016, 2).
Fanjul, blunty, called the system “defacto apartheid” (Fanjul, 2009, 239).
There is also divergence regarding the “Cordoban martyrs.” In the year 850, fifty
Christians, led by the cleric Eulogius, intentionally violated Islamic blasphemy laws and
were executed. Whether motivated by poor treatment or resentment at the loss of power
and prestige, one thing is certain: dissidence is not consistent with the portrayal of an
idyllic society. In regards to the Cordoban martyrs, Lowney writes “…the martyr activists
did deliberately seek out their own deaths by goading so-called persecutors” and that
they were “a fanatic fringe movement” (Lowney, 2005, 60). Menocal describes them as
“…wild-eyed, out of control radicals” (Menocal, 2002, 71). To this perspective,
Fernandez-Morera responds that to “…point out the ‘extremism’ of the martyrs, not the
presumably tolerant Umayyad rulers who order their slaughter… is…a scholarly
version of ‘blaming the victim” (Fernandez-Morera, 2016, 134).
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Another point is the dramatic shift in religion among the population of the
peninsula, from 10% Muslim in the year 800 to 80% Muslim by the turn of the
millennium. Lowney explains that it was just part of a natural adaptation to a new
hegemony: “Christians were embracing Islam in increasing numbers, whether for
convenience… to bolster career prospects, or moved by genuine faith” (Lowney, 2005,
63). Fernandez-Morera assesses the same phenomenon in this way:
“Christians would convert to escape the condition of dhimmitude, or flee;
Islam’s marriage laws allowed Muslim men to marry Christian women but
required the children to be raised as Muslims, and punished Christian men
with death if they fornicated with or married a Muslim woman” (FernandezMorera, 2016, 121).
The points of contention are manifold, so it should be noted that Menocal’s
Ornament of the World and Lowney’s A Vanished World as well as documentaries
like “Cities of Light” diffuse a long and complex period of history for general audiences
and they tend to focus on cultural matters rather than political or ideological sticking
points. Moreover, by bringing Islamic Spain’s contributions to the forefront, the goal of
the convivencia narrative is to compensate for the historical neglect and
misrepresentation of Spain’s Muslim legacy.
Scholars utilize different methodological approaches to the question of
convivencia. Doubleday states that an “objective historiography” (which FernandezMorera and Fanjul would represent) may be complicit in repression as it supports
traditional power structures. He also lists the problems that postmodernism addresses
in the study of history, including the “…subjective ‘positionality’ of the historian...
multiple meanings of texts… intentions of the author…impossibility of absolute
knowledge… and the fragmentary nature of the historical record” (Doubleday, 2008,
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3). Peterson describes the post-modernist view as skeptical of any traditional
“unifying” narratives:
“The post-modernists don’t really believe in narratives of identity… for
example, they would criticize the idea of the American dream as a unifying
narrative… they believe that narratives of that sort are only put in place to
justify the current power structure and to marginalize people” (Peterson,
2017).
Fernandez-Morera doesn’t seem as if he would shrink from accusations of
supporting traditional power structures anyway. In fact, he delves into an almost
conspiratorial analysis as to why the idyllic portrayal of Islamic Spain is not more
criticized:
“…such questioning would endanger the attractiveness of the field of
research that provides a living for the Islamic studies experts…
and…professional self-preservation as well as political correctness and
economics has affected academic research in certain fields of study”
(Fernandez-Morera, 2016, 7).
Predictably, Fernandez-Morera’s work has been co-opted by the right-wing in the
U.S., where he is a professor at Northwestern. Dennis Prager, the conservative
intellectual and talk-show host, for example, bragged about how sales for The Myth of
the Andalusian Paradise sky-rocketed after Fernandez-Morera appeared on his show.
Fernandez-Morera also appeared on the Christian on-line program “Focus Today”,
where he was asked, “Are there tactics you’re seeing now being used as we look at
ISIS… that you see reflected in… your studies in medieval Spain?” Fernandez-Morera
answered, “Yes, the analogies are very noticeable. The method of conquest. The use of
terror… shock and awe tactics. If a population resists, they are exterminated and
enslaved” (Focus Today, 2016).
Fanjul seems to consider the convivencia narrative as a current manifestation of
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a broader historical trend in which Spain is exoticized. In his essay, “Uses of a Myth: alAndalus” he reflects on Spain’s change in attitude towards the Muslim world over the
last thirty years, from a “prevailing anti-Arab attitude” to the virtual “Arab loving” (or
Maurophilia) today (Fanjul, 2009, 228). As an example, he describes an event called
“Andalusi Evenings” in which guests would enjoy “…dinner… musical entertainment,
dance and theater from al-Andalus” and then notes how the menu is not authentic and
theater did not exist in Islamic Spain. This new-found and poorly-informed appreciation
for things Islamic, Fanjul asserts, is due to the “…demographic explosion of the Muslim
world, the subsequent migration that reaches Spain, the control over oil
resources…and our nagging conscience towards the Third World.” Though it is a
global phenomenon, Spain is especially vulnerable to these types of trends due to its
history (Fanjul, 2009, 231).
The portrayal of the “mythical al-Andalus”, he explains, has its roots in the 19th
century. While Torrecilla (2009) asserts that Spain’s reckoning of its Islamic heritage
was part of the nation-building process, Fanjul emphasizes these visions of al-Andalus
were the result of romance novels. As French and English tourists traveled “south of the
Pyrenees” to glimpse Spain’s Oriental remnants, they wound up disappointed because
it was not as exotic as had been described in the portrayals so popular at the time.
Fanjul writes, “…the book functioned similarly to television today in that it disseminated
a virtual reality that prevailed over concrete facts and objects” (Fanjul, 2009, 231).
There certainly is a trend emphasizing Islamic heritage in Grenada, as every
Grenadiño I spoke to was stupefied at the influx of couscous restaurants and kitschy
stores over the last twenty or so years. Tremlett calls the phenomena “orientalism-with-
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tapas” and suggests that not even the people promoting the narrative believe in its
authenticity, which is, at any rate, besides the point (Tremlett, 2008, xii). The
Moroccan immigrants I spoke to, who worked at these shops, didn’t seem impressed
either. The hookah pipes, tea cups, chess sets, and assorted knick-knacks were ersatz
representations of their culture and just enabled a way to make a living.
This emphasis on Spain’s, especially Andalusia’s, Islamic history is not solely
dedicated to tourism. In addition to the 19th century romance novels, the so-called
“Black Legend” (Fuchs, 2009) which stresses Spain’s North African roots, goes back
centuries. As Spain’s wealth grew due to expansion into the New World, the legend was
spread by Spain’s jealous neighbors to the north and is meant as an insult (though not
always taken as one). The French saying, “Spain begins at the Pyrenees” expresses
the same kind of slight. The anthropologist Barbara Fuchs writes that Spain was
“…Orientalized by its European rivals in a deliberate attempt to undermine its
triumphant self-construction as a Catholic nation from 1492 and on” (Fuchs, 2009, 3).
Spain’s repudiation of Muslims and Islamic culture in the 15th and 16th centuries seem to
have been motivated, at least in part, to shake the mystique of the Orient.
If we accept the premise that narratives are, essentially, utilitarian, then whether
convivencia is a beacon of hope or a naïve myth is probably a reflection of one’s
political tendencies and the ideas one would like to promote. Lowney writes, “St. James
two conflicting images-killer and pilgrim-have nothing to do with the saint himself and
everything to do with his devotees” (Lowney, 2005, 13). To say the same is true for
proponents or detractors of convivencia is not to diminish historicity, rather, it is an
acknowledgement that subjectivity will always play its part.
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As for the elements necessary for the maturation of the St. James narrative, the
same seem to be present for convivencia. Both narratives emerged from crisis. For St.
James it was the Muslim invasion while for convivencia, it is present-day inter-religious
strife, especially as it pertains to Spain’s history. Both narratives are embedded in the
standard frameworks of their societies. St. James was a Christian saint while
convivencia represents modern, secular, and western values. St. James received
support from written works by religious authorities, which spread to the population.
Convivencia has been supported by academic works, which have seeped into popular
culture.
Both narratives make historical claims for legitimacy. The proponents of the St.
James narrative praise the pre-Islamic Visigoths while proponents of convivencia
suggest our modern ideals were already realized in Spain’s Islamic era. Both narratives
can be reduced to a Manichean tale. Divinity was on the Christians side as St. James’
broke from the sky at critical moments to aid their cause. Convivencia is more subtle.
The “good guys” are those who can see beyond the superficial differences of others.
The “bad guys” are the religious fundamentalists, antagonistic and disruptive to interfaith harmony. It is in this distinction between stark clarity and nuance that the narratives
are distinct. There is no militant intensity in convivencia, no Castor and Pollux.
The hopes for convivencia becoming an imagined order also break down due to
the uniqueness of our times and subjectivities of our visions.

42

PART 3: PRESENTISM AND NOSTALGIA
I met Duha Escudero at a café in Cordoba. Her father, Mansur Escudero, was
one of the founders of La Junta Islamica, an organization dedicated to achieving civil
rights for Muslims in Spain. Duha explained how she and her brothers were carrying on
their father’s mission and this was apparent in her willingness to meet with me to inform
my research. When I asked her what she thought about the concept of convivencia,
she said that though prevalent in Spain, it was not reaching its potential: “Cordoba has
the opportunity to have it again but refuses. It would bring more tourists. It would be
good to alleviate the crisis.”
There is a tension regarding Spain’s religious history that sometimes manifests
itself at the Grand Mosque in Cordoba. Constructed during Abd al-Rahman I’s reign in
the 8th century, the mosque was built over a demolished Visigothic church, some
remnants of which can still be seen there. During the reconquista, Cordoba was taken
over by Christian forces who, thankfully, did not destroy the building, but did partially
ruin its aesthetics by building a cathedral in the center of it. Fortunately, one can still find
vantage points to admire the stark columns and geometrics of the original design
without the blight of the ornate cathedral.
By appearances, the building is obviously a mosque and Cordobans typically call
it “la mosca.” To its custodians, however, it is unambiguously a church. The title on the
visitors’ brochure is “The Cathedral of Cordoba”, its ecclesiastical name is the Cathedral
of Our Lady of the Assumption, and mass is held there regularly. In 2006, when the
Bishop of Cordoba was asked if Muslims could pray in there, he refused, and added
that the church had been there first, referring to the ancient one built by the Visigoths.

43

Occasionally, Muslims do try to pray there and security springs into action to stop them.
An opportunity was lost, as Duha sees it, by the refusal to allow it to be a shared as an
inter-faith space.
The spirit of convivencia is better represented in the pleasant and peaceful
Alpujarras region where many conversos, or New Muslims, reside. Thanks to Ali, I was
able to meet Duha and, before that, a respected elder of the Sufi Naqshbandi Order in
Orgiva, a small city and the regional capital of the Alpujarras. After a brief chat, he drove
me out to their mosque in the countryside, where I met several men who welcomed me
warmly.
There, a Moroccan man explained to me that he loved the practice of Islam here
in Spain as opposed to what he was used to in his country. This point was echoed by
virtually everyone I spoke to there: the Islam we practice here is not Wahabism, the
especially stringent branch of Islam practiced in, and exported from, Saudi Arabia. “This
is the Alpujarras”, the man said in a tone which seemed to denote freedom as much as
fresh mountain air. It was appropriate that Islam should return not just to Spain, but
to this region in particular. In the 16th century, the Alpujarras was a Muslim hold-out
stubbornly resisting the increasing restrictions and predations of Christian hegemony,
staging uprisings before eventual defeat.
Though there are a number of different tariqas, or paths, the New Muslims in
Spain practice Sufism, often referred to as the mystical branch of Islam. Duha told me
that some Muslims don’t even consider Sufism to be Islam and some Sufis don’t claim
to be Muslims, but she considers those views extreme and certainly far from her own.
“Islam is the glass” she said, “and Sufism is the water.” But the Sufism practiced in
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Spain seems to not only define itself by its other – Wahabism – but also by its
connection to Spain’s Islamic era. In fact, when I asked Duha if the preferred term was
conversos, or New Muslims, or what, she said either was fine and that there was
another informal, anglicized term: “revertos”, meaning converts were simply reverting
to their Islamic origins.
In her essay, “Spain’s New Muslims: A Historical Romance”, the journalist Lisa
Abend writes of the New Muslims, “…for them, purity lies not with the age of
Mohammed, nor with a literal reading of the deeds and teachings described in the
Quran. It lies with Spain’s medieval past” (Abend, 2008,138). This independence of
thought and spirit is consistent with Islamic Spain itself as Abd al-Rhamn III claimed his
own caliphate in 929 and, at least for the duration of the Umayyad dynasty, Islamic
Spain was considered the apex of civilization, not Baghdad or Damascus, despite their
historical pedigrees.
In general, the New Muslims rely on an understanding of their Islamic past to
support an ethos which rejects violence, supports human rights, supports women’s
rights, and is pro-democracy. Mansur Escudero wrote, “The spirit of al-Andalus-its
respect for freedom of conscience, its recognition of women’s rights-is what we consider
genuine Islam” (Escudero, cited in Abend, 2008, 143). However, looking to Spain’s
period of convivencia for inspiration seems amenable to exaggeration. Abend mentions
a book entitled The Arabs Never Invaded Spain, which reports that the Islamization of
the peninsula in the 8th century was more a matter of “force Ideas” than force (Abend,
2008, 140). Abend writes, “So peaceful and harmonious is the al-Andalus imagined by
converts… that it cannot admit a violent origin” (Abend, 2008, 141). Yet, Abend makes
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a distinction between this point of view and Menocal’s not only because the latter is a
well-supported academic work, but because of its portrayal as a society that no longer
exists. The New Muslims, Abend argues, stress a continuation (Abend, 2008).
To be fair, the political discussion regarding New Muslims may be a matter of
how much is projected onto them. Duha told me that she, for example, is unaffiliated
with any tariqa, and stressed that Sufism was about spirituality, not politics. While she
was explaining to me what it was like to be an Occidental Muslim, she said that “religion
is something you carry inside yourself.” And what was most impressive to me was
Farhat’s being embraced by the community during a difficult time. He said, “I was born
Muslim. It’s in my blood, not like converts. When I saw the Sufis, it was strange for me,
but nice. They’re Europeans and they’re Muslims.” He seemed as moved by their
generosity as he was surprised by the novelty.
To be sure, the convivencia theme is not confined to the New Muslims. After the
11/M attacks, the imam from Madrid’s “M-30” mosque (which is not Sufi), called for
peace by invoking the spirit of convivencia. There is little doubt about the usefulness of
the term and it has come a long way since outlined by Americo Castro in the 1940’s.
Both Castro’s original meaning and the modern usage are linked to how we perceive
Islamic Spain and Castro seemed to intuit, from the beginning, these perceptions would
not change overnight:
“The way in which I am carrying out this task of rectifying the history of
Spain as it is now accepted is similar, in a certain way, to a border war….
There are those who attempt to invade the already conquered terrain, and
then the enemy must be driven out. If I do not do it, no historian will come
to help me” (Castro, cited in Araya Goubet, 48).
It is interesting that Castro uses the metaphor of “borders” because I often
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thought, during my research, that the imposition of politics and its delineating lines
across a medieval culture was akin to the straight lines drawn by colonial British and
French authorities over terrain traveled by nomads. That is to say, to politicize the era,
any historical era, would be a rigid partitioning of what is inherently multi-dimensional. In
Performing Al-Andalus: Music and Nostalgia across the Mediterranean (2015), the
anthropologist Jonathan Shannon explores the musical culture emanating from Islamic
Spain. In Exotic Nation (2009), Barbara Fuchs examines Spain’s 16th century material
culture of horsemanship, architecture, and clothing. Both books complicate the notion
that we can easily distinguish what is Spain from what is Islamic Spain.
Music, Shannon writes, has the ability “…to penetrate and traverse margins and
boundaries of the self, of bodies and entire nations and regions” (Shannon, 2015, 7).
Perhaps due to its ephemeral nature and apparent desire to blend forms, it is virtually
impossible to trace the origin of musical styles. Where do we say where one musical
genre begins and another ends? Which chord, struck by which artist, was the birth of
rock and roll? Shannon relates a story in which, while in a music store in Granada, he
requests Andalusian music that is more Arabic-oriented, as opposed to Flamenco. The
owner responds, “They are the same! They are all sons of Ziryab!” (Shannon, 2015, 23).
What could be called “Andalusian music” covers a broad area, from Spain and across
the Maghreb, as well as a broad scope, across multiple genres. How different these
genres are, or even if they are different, is a matter of opinion. Yet, all roads seem to
lead back to Ziryab, the great musician of Islamic Spain.
Like convivencia, Ziryab, in addition to a historical reality, represents an idea to
modern day admirers. Shannon writes, “Ziryab serves as a symbolic starting point for
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histories of Andalusian music and a marker of both the indebtedness of al-Andalus to
Levantine culture and its subsequent divergence” (Shannon, 2015, 40). If we consider
multiple musical styles from Andalusia and the Mediterranean to be “sons of Ziryab”,
then that is an embrace of the idea of synthesis, over the more banal ideas of division
and categorization. On a web page, Ali Keeler describes the music of the Al Firdaus
Ensemble as “…a synthesis of musical traditions, Western Classical, Celtic, Arabic,
Andalusi, and Flamenco” (Keeler, 2017).
Andalusian music can also intertwine with convivencia in the service of “bridgebuilding.” The Washington Post noted the Al Firdaus Ensemble was beginning its tour in
the U.S. just as Donald Trump, then a candidate, had mentioned the possibility of a
travel ban for Muslims. “While the musicians of Al Firdaus did not set out to influence
the contentious discussion around Islam, they are aware that this tour, at this time, in
some small way could have an impact” (Montgomery, 2016). The darbuka player from
the ensemble, Muhammad Dominquez, was quoted as saying, “When Islam has such
bad press, we are ambassadors” (Montgomery, 2016). (Incidentally, and by way of
connecting to Islamic Spain, the concerts were called “Sounds of the Al hambra.”)
Shannon writes of attending a concert in Fez in the spring of 2004 and Omar
Metioui, a prominent Moroccan musician, said that the performance was to “promote
healing” after recent terrorist attacks and that music was crucial to “bridging divides.”
Shannon writes, “…if different peoples can perform music together; then they can stand
a better chance of getting along” (Shannon, 2015, 160). Music seems to stand apart
from other art forms in this function and beyond criticism. It’s clear to anyone who ever
picked up an instrument and tried to play with someone else: you can’t do it if you’re not
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genuinely listening to each other. Also, there is nothing didactic about music. It speaks
directly to the soul.
In Exotic Nation, Fuchs describes how in 16th century Spain, things that were
determined to be Islamic, or Moorish, were banned, yet, other things, like juegos de
canas (horse-riding games), or the beautiful Spanish veils, were not. Were they so
valued that they were given a pass, or was it difficult, by that point, to even decipher
their origins? Fuchs points out that if it had not been for the eye of European visitors, to
recognize certain customs as distinctly not European, native Andalusians would have
been unable to. It was the custom in Spain, for example, for women to sit on the floor.
Not much was thought of it until a visiting Flemish courtier took notice and remarked on
it. Again the question is: how can one say where one custom, one design, one style of
clothing begins and another ends, when, in fact, they have already fused? But this
was precisely the conundrum of 16th century Spain, and, to some extent, it has
persisted into the present day.
Even the foundational narratives were complicated, or controversial, from their
inception. After the success of the reconquista, what was there to make of the
significant Muslim population that held ties to communities and centuries-old roots to the
land? Fuchs writes:
“The Moorish question was hardly a dead letter in sixteenth-century Spain,
as the new nation struggled to reconcile its loud rhetoric of exclusivist and
homogenous Christianity with the presence of large numbers of variously
assimilated Moors in its territory” (Fuchs, 2009, 8).
There is even a sub-field in Cervantes studies which deals with the relationships
between Christians and Moors in 16th century Spain by closely examining and
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interpreting this theme in parts of Don Quixote (Rouhi, 2008). Fuchs also describes the
ballads that were common at the time, some of which mourned for the Moors and
others, in retort, admonished those ballads and called for more appropriate ones which
honored the Christian victors (Fuchs, 2009).
The tension between what Fuchs calls “maurophobia” and “maurophila” is
perhaps best evident in the story of Novela del Abencerraje y Jarifa. The Christian hero,
Rodrigo de Narvaez captures the Muslim Abindarraez, but when Abindarraez informs
Rodrigo that he was on his way to marry his love, Jarifa, he evokes Rodrigo’s sympathy.
The two decide to make a pact that Abindarraez will be let go, but only under the
condition that he return after he has married Jarifa. He does, and the adventure
continues with Rodrigo, on Abindarraez’s behalf, petitioning the king for a pardon.
Fuchs explains there are three versions to the story but many more
interpretations. This story of chivalry could be a lament for the loss of Muslim friends
and neighbors as well as resistance to the increasing religious intolerance. Other
interpretations, though, address what Fuch’s calls the “conqueror’s discursive
framework” (Fuchs, 2009, 38). That is, storytellers are in a position of power and
therefore will always tell a version which is favorable to them. Even so, the story
demonstrates an underlying mutual respect, whatever the motivation of the storytellers,
which complicates monolithic “us versus them” narratives.
Fuchs asserts that the “maurophobia and maurophila” theme is a permanent
fixture in discourse of Islamic Spain. A key element in this game is Spain’s relationship
to broader Europe in its role as gatekeeper. Spain’s broad coastline and proximity to
North Africa has given them the enormous responsibility of patrolling its waters, trying to
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intercept would-be immigrants traveling in pateras, small, unsafe boats. Aside from
that, Spain’s complicated heritage, some have suggested, causes Spain to strive to “be”
European, as opposed to actually just “being” European. This point of view suggests an
insecurity which, in turn, manifests in discrimination against Moroccans (Flessler 2008,
Rogozen-Soltar, 2012).
“Maurophilia and maurophobia” tensions may also be evident in other ways.
Javier told me,
“…the most traditional Catholics in Spain are in Andalusia. Maybe that
was a way of conquering culturally. The cathedral in Seville is the 3 rd
largest in the world. The Basque country and Galicia are not so religious.
The magnificent Easter rituals are in the south.”
And a man I met at the mosque in the Alpujarras told me that it was the
Spaniards’ great willingness to distance themselves from Muslims that fueled their
love of pork. They love pork more than any other Europeans, he said, precisely because
Muslims want nothing to do with it. A few days after talking to him, I was walking around
Madrid, skeptically considering what he said and asking myself, do Spaniards love pork
more than other Europeans? Just then I looked up and saw a sign: “Museo del
Jamon.” So maybe he was right.
The same man told me a story about how when he was a boy, an elderly woman
had cried out the expression, “Oh, Mohammad!” in Arabic, and then quickly looked
around to see if anyone had heard her. Just as Duha had told me about the survival of
the practice of wudhu, he was suggesting undercurrents from the past can traverse
time, this time via sound and language. Others told me that family heirlooms provide
physical links to their otherwise lost heritage. I don’t doubt it, but attempts by New
Muslims to link the present to the past are difficult not only because of the passage of
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time, but because of the uniqueness of the time we live in.
No matter how well-intentioned or well-supported, it is difficult for any narrative in
this era to gain traction because it will be met, immediately, by contrarian points of view.
Social media outlets and 24-hour news cycles guarantee conflicting narratives at every
turn; totally different takes on essentially the same news item. Attempts to re-orient
ourselves to a post 9/11 world, in general, have been an amalgamation of narratives,
often contentious and antagonistic towards each other.
The St. James narrative had the advantage of being left alone for a couple of
hundred years in a mountainous backwater. It was also embedded in the sturdy
framework of Christianity and the collective imagination of its adherents. In short, it is
easier to rally an isolated group already locked in step to established and unquestioned
religious norms than it is to build bridges among groups more bent on burning them
down.
This offers an example of what the historian Francois Hartog describes as
“Presentism”: “…the sense that only the present exists, a present characterized by the
tyranny of the instant and by the treadmill of the unending now” (Hartog, 2003, xv).
Historical narratives, however faulted with myth and misunderstanding, were once
understood with reverence and attachment. The Napoleonic era, Hartog argues, broke
from the past and presented a more future-looking attitude. But since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, there has been a crisis in confidence in nation-states to carry us through
generational time (Hartog, 2003).
This collapse of the more collectively-held narratives of the past has led to a
“fragmentation of subjectivities” which, in hopes to better understand it, has led to a rise
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in the popularity of memory studies (Shannon, 2015, 13). In “Nostalgia and its
Discontents”, Svetlana Boym describes distinct human emotions, desires, or ambitions
as being represented by distinct types of nostalgia. As I read her essay, I thought of the
multiple interpretations of Islamic Spain I had come across and how each one seemed
to fit into a category Boym had laid out.
For example, Boym’s concept of “Restorative nostalgia” reminded me of the
traditional Spanish historians, Fernandez-Morera, Fanjul, and Sanchez-Albornoz. Boym
writes that this type of nostalgia,
“…does not think of itself as nostalgia but truth and tradition…it protects
the absolute truth…it knows two main plots-the return to origins and the
conspiracy…it returns and rebuilds one homeland with paranoic
determination...it is about universal values, family, nature, homeland,
truth… This worldview is based on a single transhistorical plot, a
Manichaean battle of good and evil, and the inevitable scapegoating of the
mythical enemy.” (Boym, 2007, 13)
In “Uses of a Myth: al-Andalus,” (2009), it is apparent that Fanjul shares an
existential fear with Sanchez-Albornoz. The contemporary historian cites his forbear’s
dystopian dream in which Islam had triumphed in Spain. Sanchez-Albornoz writes, “The
grave of Santiago had never been found and therefore the legend of the Knight apostle
had never existed. There were no pilgrimages to Compostela, nor did the culture of
Christian Europe ever cross the Pyrenees” (Sanchez-Albornoz, cited in Fanjul, 2009,
243). Sanchez-Albornoz goes on to lament the loss of the great Spanish Cathedrals, as
well as El Greco, Velazquez, and Goya. The sentiment expressed here is the one that is
often buttressed against convivencia and its enthusiasm for Islamic Spain: it diminishes
the 500 years of illustrious history that came after.
Boym also describes “Reflective nostalgia” which I found reminiscent of
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Menocal’s work. Boym writes that reflective nostalgia
“…thrives on algia (the longing itself) and delays the homecomingwistfully, ironically, desperately…. it dwells on the ambivalences of
human longing and belonging and does not shy away from the
contradictions of modernity… it calls truth into doubt…it does not follow
a single plot… The focus here is not on the recovery of what is perceived
to be an absolute truth, but on the meditation on history and the passage
of time (Boym, 2007, 13).
In a somewhat psychoanalytic essay, “Expulsion from Paradise” (2008), Denise
Filios writes that via Ornament of the World, Menocal “…incorporates her own story as
a Cuban exile and migrant intellectual into her story of al-Andalus” (Filios, 2008, 94) Abd
al-Rahman, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty in al-Andalus, was, after all, a man in
exile. He survived the Abbasid coup in Damscus and traversed across North Africa to
Spain. Not by chance, Filios asserts, Menocal includes in her book a poem by Abd alRahman in which he longs for his home.
Both the contemporary and traditional narratives come across as cautionary
tales, yet, they include a longing for something beyond. Convivencia represents a Spain
as a synthesis of cultures and a symbol of harmony; the traditional narratives represent
a Spain proud of its reconquista and expansion. As different as those visions are,
somehow, they are encapsulated in Boym’s more general description of nostalgia:
“…mourning for the impossibility of mythical return, for the loss of an ‘enchanted world’
with clear borders and values” (Boym, 2007, 12).
Accepting the importance of subjectivity would emphasize taking a closer look at
a scholar’s background, or at least suggest that it is part of the discussion. In a recent
interview, Harari was asked about his practice of Vipassana meditation. (He meditates
for two hours a day and often goes on 30 to 60-day silent retreats.) He said, “The key is
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just to observe reality, as it is, every moment. Just to stay focused on what is really
happening right now as against all the stories, the explanations that our minds
constantly generate” (Harari, 2017). Harari’s meditation practice explains his intense
interest in the nature of reality and how it informs his work. “Everything people do, I can
say as a historian, from sitting in your chair to starting a world war, you’re actually acting
to sensations in your body” (Harari, 2017). Feelings create thoughts, thoughts elaborate
into narratives, and narratives, sometimes, become imagined orders.
But what does one do with this information? The idea that imagined ordersmoney, corporations, stock exchanges, bureaucracies, borders and so on- are all
figments of our collective imagination – may be interesting but may also obscure
people’s problems, especially when dealing with these various “imagined” entities. So
why bother at all? Harari suggests that one should keep in mind the difference between
what is imagined and what is real because the interplay between the two occupies a
third space.
He relates the story of Aristedes de Sousa Mendes, a Portuguese consul who
was assigned to Bordeux in 1940. Germany had just invaded France and Portuguese
authorities ordered him not to issues visas to Jews trying to escape the Nazi
encroachment. He refused. He and his team worked around the clock for ten days
stamping thousands of visas. What an ink stamp on a piece of paper meant was entirely
up to the collective imagination of the civil servants in France, Spain, and Portugal.
Fortunately, they accepted the intended meaning of the stamps and granted safe
passage. Aristedes de Sousa Mendes may well have understood that the ideas
represented by ink impressed on paper were imaginary. What he certainly understood

55

was that people’s lives were at stake. Therefore, to understand that something is
imaginary is not to dismiss it, but rather accept it, and mold the imaginings towards a
desired goal. It is estimated that de Sousa Mendes saved over 30,000 lives (Harari,
2017).
“Without commonly accepted stories about things like money, states and
corporations, no complex human society can function. We can’t play
football unless everyone believes in the same made-up rules… But stories
are just tools. They should not become our goals or our yard sticks”
(Harari, 2017, 177).
It is better to understand this third space so that a poor goal (in this case,
obedience to bureaucratic rules) does not take precedence over a good one (saving
people’s lives). In order to do this, value must be assigned to goals and the narratives
which support them. Human Rights is not an objective biological reality. Yet, we’re
happy to have it. Nazism was not an objective biological reality either, and we’re happy
to be rid of it. The assigning of value - what is good, what is bad - is an inherently
arbitrary, but necessary process. One might find oneself in the strange position of
defending ideas he/ she knows are entirely made-up only because they are better than
other ideas which are also entirely made-up. The advantage in knowing that they are all
made-up allows that individual to choose ideas wisely and modify them in accordance
with goals. The Spanish traditionalists understand, certainly, that the foundational
narrative of St. James is not objectively real, but its manifestations were. Therefore, the
narrative is good and useful. Proponents of convivencia have decided that narrative is
better as it embodies inter-faith harmony.
While narratives seem to possess common elemental structures, the variation
comes in the psychological processes underpinning them (Harari, 2017, Boym, 2007).
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To what extent they manifest is due to the peculiarities of their time (Hartog, 2015) and,
I think, the inherent potency of the narrative itself.
In 997, al-Mansur and his army raided Santiago de Compostela. The town was
razed and the church was destroyed. Significantly, the bells from the church were taken,
forced to be carried on the backs of slaves, all the way to Cordoba where they were
melted down to be used as lamps in the Great Mosque. Al-Mansur targeted
Compostela, which was remote and unimportant militarily, precisely because of its
religious significance. In the same vein, churches are built on top of mosques, which are
built on top of churches. “Inter-faith” spaces are rare.
Harari explains how a theologian might tell lovely stories about God and can
perhaps convince even an ardent atheist to see the light in religion and not to mistake
the denotation for the connotation, but he insists this is the not the historical religious
force:
“This is not the God of history. This is not the god that launched the
Crusades, or jihad, or any religious wars and persecutions… There is a
huge gap between the god of the theologians and the God of the masses,
and from a historical perspective, it’s the God of the masses that really
counts. It’s the angry man in the sky” (Harari, 2017).
The god of Santiago Matamoros was the god of the masses. The god of
convivencia is not. What impedes convivencia’s development, above other reasons,
towards an imagined order is its lack of the brute power and agency.
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Figure I. The Al hambra.

Figure II. “Orientalism with Tapas.”
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Figure III. Mezquita Mayor de Granada.

Figure IV. Mosque in La Cortujo.
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Figure V. Café Baraka in Orgiva.

Figure V. Museo del Jamon.
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Figure VI. The Grand Mosque in Cordoba.

Figure VII. Orgiva.
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Figure VIII. The Cathedral in the Mosque.

Figure IX. The horseshoe arches in the Grand Mosque.
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Figure X. Visgothic designs in the Grand Mosque.

Figure XI. The mosque in the Alpujarras.
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